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Abstract 
The  proposal  of  indistinguishable  encryption  in  Randomized 
Arithmetic Coding(RAC) doesn’t make the system efficient because it 
was not encrypting the messages it sends. It recomputes the cipher 
form  of  every  messages  it  sends  that  increases  not  only  the 
computational cost but also increases the response time.Floating point 
representation in cipher  increases the difficulty in decryption side 
because of loss in precison.RAC doesn’t handle the inference attacks 
like  Man-in-Middle  attack,Third  party  attack  etc.  In  our  system, 
Dynamic Matrix  Arithmetic  Coding(DMAC)  using dynamic session 
matrix to encrypt the messages. The size of the matrix is deduced from 
the session key that contains ID of end users which proves the server 
authentication.Nonce values is represented as the public key of the 
opponents encrypted by the session key will be exchanged between the 
end users to provide mutual authentication. If the adversary try to 
compromise either server or end users,the other system won’t respond 
and  the  intrusion  will  be  easily  detected.  we  have  increased  the 
hacking complexity of AC by integrating with RSA upto 99%. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Arithmetic  coding  -  The  source  symbols  are  encoded 
numerically [1] [6]. Each symbol does not necessarily translate 
into the same indexed code each time it is encoded. An input 
source  string  is  represented  by  an  interval  of  real  numbers 
between 0 and 1. The range of the interval is need by two values, 
high and low, which are equal to 1 and 0 initially. The interval is 
successively  subdivided  as  each  new  source  symbol  is  read. 
Highly probable symbols (with respect to the model, as distinct 
from the more probable symbols in the input) reduce the interval 
by a smaller amount than less probable symbols. The precision 
with which to represent the interval increases in accordance with 
the length of the input string. 
Key  Based  Interval  Splitting-a  modification  of  arithmetic 
coding that uses key-based interval splitting to simultaneously 
enable data compression and encryption [2][7]. We have shown 
that even when intervals in an arithmetic coder are split, the code 
length  increases  relative  to  traditional  arithmetic  coding  is 
bounded  to  less  than  1  bit  per  N-symbol  sequence,  and  in 
practice,the increase is often approximately 0.5 bits per -symbol 
sequence. In percentage terms, this efficiency penalty becomes 
negligibly  small  as  N  increases.  The  splitting  produces 
encryption, the level of which is a function of the attributes of 
the key and the encoded sequence. While we have focused on 
the static binary case for simplicity, the methods presented here 
can also be applied to M-ary and/or adaptive arithmetic coding. 
Secure Arithmetic Coding-An arithmetic coder in which the 
intervals associated with each symbol combination are split in 
accordance with a key, and in which permutations are applied 
both  to  input  symbol  sequence  and  to  the  output  binary 
sequence,  has  been  presented  [3][9].  The  system  offers  both 
compression and security, and thwarts all known attacks aimed 
at obtaining information about the input or output permutation or 
the interval splitting keys. For each encoded symbol, a pair of 
intervals  is  split,  and  this  split  can  occur  in  parallel.  So  the 
throughput  can  be  identical  to  that  of  a  traditional  arithmetic 
coder. The permutations add negligible complexity. The security 
problem of Secure Arithmetic Coding (SAC) under an adaptive 
chosen-cipher text attack is it can recover the key vectors used in 
the codeword permutation step with complexity Ο (N), where N 
is the symbol sequence length [4]. This indicates that the SAC is 
not suitable for those applications where the attacker can have 
access  to  the  decoder.  Furthermore,  we  have  discussed  an 
improved version of the SAC such that it can resist the adaptive 
chosen-cipher text attack and can be conveniently incorporated 
with the context-based coding. 
Modifications of arithmetic coding (AC) have been proposed 
to improve the security of traditional AC [8] [10]. Two main 
modifications to AC are randomized AC (RAC) and AC with 
key-based  interval  splitting  (KSAC).  Chosen-plaintext  attacks 
have been proposed for these two methods when the same key is 
used to encrypt different messages [9]. The security of AC in is 
based on the inability of the adversary to distinguish between the 
encryption of one plaintext from the encryption of another. By 
this  definition,  we prove  that RAC is insecure even  if a new 
random key is used to compress every message. The adversary 
can  only  eavesdrop  on  the  cipher  texts  and  cannot  request 
encryptions of chosen-plaintexts. The method of first-compress-
then-encrypt, where the encryption is performed by a bitwise xor 
of the compressed output with a pseudorandom bit sequence, is 
provably secure with respect to chosen-plaintext attacks[13].  
In our system, we increse the security of arithmetic coding 
by merging the DMAC, dynamic sized session matrix with RSA 
algorithm. We handle the communication line attacks like Man-
in-Middle  attack,  Third  party  attack  etc  by  introducing  nonce 
values between the end users that provides mutual authentication 
and check the server authentication using the public key of end 
users. 
2. EXISTING SYSTEM 
In this scheme (RAC) [4] that is chosen-plaintext secure, this 
is  a  stronger  notion  of  security  than  having  indistinguishable 
encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper. To understand 
this scheme, it looks at AC as defined in, where the interval [0, 
1) is split in two ways as shown in Fig.1. The traditional way of 
partitioning the interval [0, 1) is according to the probabilities 
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Another  way  to  partition  the  interval  [0,  1)  is  split  into 
subintervals of equal lengths and labeled 0 and 1. Partitioning 
once results in two subintervals [0, 0.5) (labeled 0) and [0.5, 1) 
(labeled 1). Partitioning once more results in each subinterval 
being  partitioned  into  two  intervals  of  equal  length.  Thus  the 
interval [0, 1) is partitioned into the following four subintervals 
of equal length: [0, 0.25) (labeled 00), [0.25, 0.5) (labeled 01), 
[0.5, 0.75) (labeled 10), and [0.75, 1) (labeled 11). Therefore, 
doing the partitioning n times results in the interval [0, 1) being 
partitioned into 2
n subintervals each labeled with a distinct -bit 
binary number. The i
th of these subintervals is referred to as Ei(n) 
and label Ei(n) as the n-bit binary expansion of i, that is the label 
for that subinterval (i = 0,1,….2
n-1). A string S that needs to be 
compressed  is  first  converted  into  interval  I(S)  using  the 
traditional AC method. Then the smallest n such that there exists 
Ei(n) and that is completely within I(S) is found (or Ei(n) subset 
of  I(S)).  The  n-bit  label  on  this  Ei(n)  is  the  output  of  the 
compression algorithm. The bits of the output can be put out as 
the symbols S of are being read[11]. 
Let S = ABBAB and pA = 2/3 = 0.67 and pB = 1/3 = 0.33. 
Using traditional AC we find that after A is read, I (A) = [0.33, 
1). If there exists an n and I such that I (A) is completely within 
Ei(n). E0(n) = [0, 0.5) and E1(n) = [0.5, 1). Since I(AB) is not 
within E0(n) or E1(n), no output can be put out yet[17]. The next 
symbol B is read and I (AB) = [0.33,0.55). Again, since I(AB) is 
not within E0(n) or E1(n), no output can be put out yet. The third 
symbol B is read and I(ABB) = [0.33,0.4026).  Now I(ABB) is 
within E1(1) = [0.25,0.5) with label 01. Therefore the output so 
far is 01. This is true because any interval Ei(n) that is within I 
(ABB)  is  a  subinterval  of  E1(2).  Note  that  I  (ABBA)  is  not 
within any  of these intervals so the  next symbol  B is read. I 
(ABBAB)  =  [0.354,  0.37).  I(ABBAB)  is  within  E2(3)  = 
[0.25,.375) and the output is the 3-bit binary value of 2 which is 
010[11].  Ei(3),  i  =  0,…..7,  consists  of  the  intervals 
[0,1/23),[1/23,2/23),,,,,[1/23,1)=[0,0.125),[0.125,0.25),[0.25,0.3
75),[0.375,0.5),[0.5,0.625),[0.625,0.75),[0.75,0.875),[0.75,1).Sin
ce the bits 01have already had been output, we now output the 
third bit 0. However, I (ABBAB) is within a smaller interval, 
E5(4)  =  [5/24,  6/24)  =  [0.3125,  .375).  Since  the  4-bit  binary 
expansion  of  5=0101  and  the  most  significant  three  bits  010 
have already been output we now output the next bit 1. Since the 
last  symbol  has  already  been  read,  we  now  look  for  i  and 
smallest n such that Ei(n) is completely within I(ABBAB). 
 
Fig.1. Two ways to partition the range [0, 1) 
It finds that and i = 23 and n = 6. Thus, Ei(n) = E23(6) = 
[23/2
6, 24/2
6) = [0.3596, 0.375) is completely within I(ABBAB). 
Note  that  this  is  the  largest  interval  Ei(n)  that  is  completely 
within  I(ABBAB).  Since  the  6-bit  binary  expansion  of  23  = 
010111  and  0101  has  already  been  output,  we  output  the 
remaining  bits  11.  Thus  the  final  output  is  010111  and  the 
decimal  value  of  0.010111  is  0.359375  and  this  is  within 
I(ABBAB) as expected. Note that maintaining Ei(n)  can be done 
incrementally with minimal overhead[11]. 
 
Fig.2. I (ABB) is a subinterval of E1(2) 
The  above  procedure  as  in  Fig.2  was  converted  into  an 
encryption by simply permuting the labels for each Ei(n). This 
can  be  done  by  doing  a  bitwise  XOR  of  each  label  with  a 
pseudorandom bit sequence of length n. Consider the labels of 
Ei(2) , which are 00, 01, 10, and 11. Doing a bitwise XOR with a 
2-bit pseudorandom bit sequence, say 10, with each of the Ei(2) 
results  in  E1(2)=10,  E1(2)=11,  E2(2)=00,  E3(2)=01[12].  This 
system is simply AC followed by XORing with a pseudorandom 
bit  sequence  using  randomized  counter  mode  of  operation.  It 
looks at AC in a different way. The interval [0, 1) is split in two 
ways: 1) Split according to the probabilities pA and pB , and 2) 
split into intervals  of equal length.  In  RAC, randomization is 
done using the first way of splitting [0, 1), while in our method 
randomization is done using the second way of splitting [0, 1). 
Since  the  randomization  or  permutation  of  the  intervals  is 
performed on intervals of equal length, unlike that in RAC, the 
new scheme is secure. 
3. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
3.1  SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
In our system in Fig.3, the security is provided in two ways: 
one by the server; other by the end user itself. When the user 
login the system, not only the status of the system is sent to the 
server, but also the public key of the user. During login, the end 
user generates two random prime numbers that in turn generates 
private and public key of the user. When the user chooses the 
recipient, the server checks the status of the recipient. If it is in 
Active state, it generates a session key that contains the details 
of sender ID, receiver ID, sender public key and recipient public 
key. When the sender and receiver receive this session key, they 
can verify the received public key with their own public key that 
provides authentication between the server and end users. The 
sender uses the receiver’s public key to encrypt the entries in the 
session matrix.  Then the nonce  values,  public  key  of the end 
users encrypted with the received session key provided by the 
server will be exchanged between the end users. The public key 
of  the  receiver  is  encrypted  with  the  session  key  sent  to  the 
recipient by the sender. The receiver verifies its own public key 
and in turn sends the sender’s public key and the sum of sender 
and receiver public key encrypted with session key send to the 
sender. This process provides the mutual authentication between 
the end users. 
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Fig.3. Architecture of DMAC 
3.2  MATRIX SIZE DETERMINATION 
After getting the session key from the server, it undergoes 
the sum of the summation of all the ASCII Codes in the message 
and its corresponding base value as in Fig.4. The output of the 
step-1 is used in two eays: one to generate a row value and the 
other to generate the column value. In row compuation side, the 
sum of the product of each digit of the ouput value in step-1 and 
the place value of each digit. The ouput value from step-1 taken 
modulo with the ouput value from step-3 to give the Row Size.In 
column compuation side, the sum of the product of each digit of 
the ouput value in step-1 and the reverse place value of each 
digit.  The  ouput  value  from  step-1  is  taken  modulo  with  the 
ouput value from step-5 to give the Column Size. 
 
Fig.4. Size Deduction 
3.3  MATRIX ENCRYPTION USING RSA 
After computing the row and column size, we formulate the 
dynamic  session  matrix  with  the  above  computed  value.  The 
entry  of  the  matrix  is  filled  with  the  sequence  of  numbers 
starting from 1, continues till it reach the entry for a[n][n] as 
shown in Fig.5. As per the above architecture, the sender holds 
the  public  key  of  the  receiver  and  vice  versa.  The  user  who 
creates the matrix to send the message encrypt the entries of the 
matrix as  M with the  public  key  of  the  opponent  using  RSA 
Algorithm.  Receiver  will  decrypt  the  values  using  his  private 
key. 
 
Fig.5. Entry Encryption with RSA 
3.4  ENCRYPTION-DMAC 
After the message formation,the message is converted into 
ASCII form. Each character’s ASCII form is added with session 
key length provided by the server. The above output is split into 
nth  and  n  -  1  digits  that  taken  as  row  index  and  column 
Index.Using the above computed indexes, get the entry from the 
encrypted matrix computed in previous process. Repeat step-3 
and step-4 for every charactes in the message. Calculate the hash 
value of the original message and append with the above value 
to form a resultant cipher as shown in Fig.6. 
 
Fig.6. Encryption using DMAC 
3.5  DECRYPTION-DMAC 
In Fig.7, the cipher and the hash value is separated after it is 
received.The cipher value is compared with the encrypted matrix 
using  sender’s  public  key.  The  Matching  indexes  will  be 
retrieved and stored in the location A. The same cipher value is 
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decrypted with the receiver’s private key,the resulting value is 
compared with the base matrix. The Matching indexes will be 
retrieved and stored in the location B. If A = B,then compute the 
subtraction  of  key  value  from  A  or  B  which  provides 
confidentiality. Perform the reverse ASCII process and compute 
the  hash  value.  If the received hash  value equal to computed 
hash value, then the message is received as send by the sender. 
3.6  OBSTRUCTION OF MAN IN THE MIDDLE & 
THIRD PARTY ATTACK 
In this system, it shows the sign in process of client. The 
server is in ready state to receive the client requests. As usual 
client passes the user name and password encrypt with server 
current  public  key  known  only  to  the  legitimate  server  and 
client.  Access  will  be  granted  by  returning  the  current  client 
public key which is known only to the corresponding client and 
trusted server if the above condition is true. If Man-in-Middle 
attack or third party attack rises, it has the possibility of giving 
fake privileges but not the current public key of the user. At the 
same time if the client that act as adversary tries to reroute the 
messages to original server, the server will detect the difference 
between the ID in the request and public key and adversary can 
be blocked.  
 
Fig.7. Decryption using DMAC 
3.7  ALGORITHM-DMAC 
Function Matrix_Size() 
begin 
n1= session key. length; 
n2= base (n1); 
for i = 0 to n1 do 
n3=ASCII (key[i])*n2
i; 
for i = 1 to n3.length do 
n4 = n3[i]*i; 
for i = n3.length to 1 do 
begin 
j = 0; 
n4 = n3[j]*i; 
j++; 
end 
rowIndex = n3%n4; 
colIndex = n3%n5; 
end 
 
Function DMACEncrypt() 
begin 
m1= ASCII(m)+sessionkey.length; 
m2= nth term of m2; 
m3= (n-1) terms of m2; 
c1= c[m2][m3]; 
h1= hash(m); 
append c1 with h1 as Cipher 
return Cipher 
end 
3.7.1  Description: 
Get the message to be send. Convert into ASCII form and 
adding session key length provided by server. Encrypt the matrix 
using  recipient’s  public  key  to  encrypt  the  message.  Get  the 
entries  for  the  corresponding  indices  from  the  matrix.  On 
decryption, decrypt the cipher with receiver private key and find 
the indexes match with the base matrix.  Match the encrypted 
cipher with the encrypted matrix to get the indexes and compare 
both the indexes. Compute the hash value and check with the 
received hash value to prove the data integrity. 
4. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The  key  vectors  used  in  the  code  word  permutation  step 
(Existing SAC) can be recovered with complexity O(NC) where 
is  NC  code  word  length.  The  Table.1  shows  the  comparative 
study of hacking complexity between the AC, ESAC [5], RMAC 
and DMAC.  In Fig.8, based on the comparative study DMAC 
has the higher hacking complexity compared to other algorithms.  
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Table.1. Hacking Complexity between ESAC & DMAC 
Text 
Length 
Code Word  Hacking Complexity  Performance 
AC  ESAC  RMAC  DMAC  AC  ESAC  RMAC  DMAC  ESAC  RMAC  DMAC 
100  100  137  119  102  100  416  241  105  24.038  41.493  95.238 
200  200  237  219  202  200  716  441  205  27.932  45.351  97.560 
300  300  337  319  302  300  1016  641  305  29.527  46.801  98.360 
400  400  437  419  402  400  1316  841  405  30.395  47.562  98.765 
500  500  537  519  502  500  1616  1041  505  30.940  48.030  99.009 
600  600  637  619  602  600  1916  1241  605  31.315  48.348  99.173 
700  700  737  719  702  700  2216  1441  705  31.588  48.577  99.290 
800  800  837  819  802  800  2516  1641  805  31.796  48.750  99.378 
900  900  937  919  902  900  2816  1841  905  31.960  48.886  99.447 
 
4.1  SAMPLE CALCULATION 
Text Length (T)  =  700 
Destination user name  =  8-16 
Key Range  =  8-16 
Maximum key Range  =  16 
Maximum Destination user 
name (D)  =  16 
Random No (NR)  =  3 
Port Identity (PI)  =  1 
Hash value (H)  =  1 
No. of Control Messages by 
client (CM)  =  2 
No. of Control Messages by 
server (SM)  =  1  
Total length of Generated 
Cipher (RMAC) 
= 
= 
= 
T + K + D + NR + PI + H 
700  + 16 + 16 + 3 + 1 + 1 
737 
Hacking Complexity (RMAC)  = 
= 
O(Nc) 
700 
Total length of Generated 
Cipher (DMAC)    
= 
= 
= 
T + NR + H 
700 + 1 + 1 
702 
Hacking Complexity (DMAC)  = 
= 
= 
O(Nc) + 3 
(702)  + 3 
705 
 
Performance   = 100
(DMAC)   Complexity   Hacking
(RMAC)   Complexity   Hacking
  
=  100
705
700
  
= 99.29% 
The security of the AC is increased by our system by 99%. 
 
Fig.8. Hacking Complexity between ESAC, RMAC and DMAC 
5. CONCLUSION 
 In our system, we satisfied 3 out of 4 goals of cryptography 
that are data integrity, confidentiality and authentication. Usage 
of integer form with randomness in representing cipher, not only 
makes the decryption easy but also it reduces the overhead in 
computation in handling precision. Message indistinguishability 
is not needed because the authentication is provided both from 
the server and end users. The unsatisfied goal is nothing but non-
repudiation that requires logs which records the activities during 
the session that leads to log management, concurrency control, 
database  security  etc  that  makes  the  system  very  complex  to 
implement.  
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